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1Group Rekeying Schemes for Secure Group
Communication in Wireless Sensor Networks
Yong Wang, Byrav Ramamurthy, and Yuyan Xue
Abstract— Wireless sensor networks are promising solutions
for many applications. However, wireless sensor nodes suffer
from many constraints such as low computation capability, small
memory, limited energy resources, and so on. Grouping is an
important technique to localize computation and reduce com-
munication overhead in wireless sensor networks. In this paper,
we use grouping to refer to the process of combining a set of
sensor nodes with similar properties. We propose four centralized
group rekeying (CGK) schemes for secure group communication
in sensor networks. The lifetime of a group is divided into three
phases, i.e., group formation, group maintenance, and group
dissolution. We demonstrate how to set up the group and establish
the group key in each phase. We further analyze and evaluate
the performance of the proposed schemes in different scenarios.
Index Terms— Wireless sensor network, secure group commu-
nication, clustering, grouping
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are used in many ap-
plications in military, environmental and health related areas.
However, nodes in a WSN suffer from many constraints such
as low computation capability, small memory, limited energy
resources, and so on. Grouping is an important technique to
localize computation and reduce communication overhead in
WSNs.
The most common method of grouping is clustering. The
essential operation in sensor node clustering is to select a
set of cluster heads among the sensors in the network, and
cluster the rest of the nodes with these heads [1]. Cluster
heads are responsible for coordination among the nodes within
their clusters, and communication with each other and/or with
external observers on behalf of their clusters. Many routing
protocols and key management protocols have been proposed
using the clustering technique [2], [3].
However, grouping goes far beyond clustering. In this paper,
we use grouping to refer to the process of combining a set
of sensors with similar properties. The essential operation
in sensor node grouping is to dynamically combine a set
of sensors based on the observed events. The result of the
grouping is a group. Unlike clustering focusing on the whole
sensor network, grouping is only involved with sensors in
a small region. Without additional clarifications, the term
grouping in this paper refers to the local combination of a
set of sensor nodes.
There are many similarities between clustering and group-
ing, for example:
• Sensors in a cluster or a group are usually geographically
close to each other.
• Both clustering and grouping are used to localize com-
putation and reduce communication overhead.
• A cluster usually has a cluster head and a group may
have a group controller.
However, important differences exist between clustering and
grouping. The main differences are listed below:
• Clustering is a global concept while grouping usually
focuses on a small region. When clustering is used in
a sensor network, the whole sensor network is divided
into clusters. However, grouping usually involves with
a relatively small number of sensors. These sensors are
combined together based on the defined properties.
• Clustering and grouping could be adopted separately or
together. They do not depend on each other. Grouping
can be carried out with clustering or without.
• When clustering and grouping are both used to organize
a sensor network, a group could be a part of a cluster, or
even the union of several clusters.
• Clusters are decided by the partition algorithm adopted
in the sensor networks. There is no relation between
the clusters and the observed events. However, groups
are usually activated by events. A group is set up and
dissolved on the fly.
Security is an important research area in sensor networks
[4]. In this paper, we focus on secure group communication
(SGC) [5]. Secure group communication in sensor networks
refers to a scenario in which sensors in a group can send
and receive messages to/from group members in a way that
outsiders are unable to glean any information even when they
are able to intercept the messages. Secure group communi-
cation depends on the group key to protect the messages.
The security requirements of group communication include
authentication, confidentiality, integration, freshness etc. [5].
In addition, secure group communication also requires forward
secrecy and backward secrecy [5]:
• Forward secrecy: A sensor should not be able to read any
future messages after it leaves the group.
• Backward secrecy: A joining sensor should not be able
to read any previously transmitted message.
The obvious benefit of secure group communication to
WSNs is that outside nodes are unable to obtain any messages
transmitted to the group. Secure group communication is also
attractive for in-network processing and data aggregation [6].
The group controller can be used to aggregate similar data
to reduce the communication overhead in a sensor network.
Further, recent research has also revealed that the group key
can be used for filtering false data injected in a sensor network
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2[7], [8]. The basic idea using the group keys to filter the
injected false data is as follows: Sensor nodes are divided
into multiple groups. Nodes in the same group share a group
key and the base station knows all the group keys. Each
data report sent to the base station is attached with multiple
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and each MAC is
generated by a node that detects the same event. When the
data report is forwarded along the way to the the base station,
an en-route node may use its group key to verify the MACs
probabilistically and drop those with invalid MACs at earliest
points. The base station further filters out remaining false
reports that escape the en-route filtering.
Although a few papers [9], [10] discussed secure group
communication in sensor networks in literature, the problem
has not been well studied. Previous works on secure group
communication either consider the whole sensor network as
a group or define the immediate neighboring nodes around a
sensor as a group. However, grouping is more general than
these two cases.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows: We formally
define the grouping and secure group communication problem
in WSNs. We differentiate between the concepts of clustering
and grouping. We propose four centralized group rekeying
schemes for secure group communication in WSNs and further
evaluate their performances in various group settings.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses
the related work. Section III introduces grouping and its
properties. Section IV presents our proposed centralized group
rekeying schemes, followed by the security and performance
analysis in Section V, the simulation and results in Section
VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The secure group communication problem has been ex-
tensively studied in the context of secure multicast in wired
or wireless networks. Many centralized solutions and a few
distributed solutions have been proposed. However, most of
them are not suitable for WSNs. For example, the centralized
schemes proposed in [11], [12] assume a key tree is maintained
in the central controller. However, none of them considers
the management overhead of such a key tree structure in the
central controller, which is important in sensor networks due to
the constraints on the sensor nodes. The distributed schemes,
such as [13], [14], use exponential operations to generate
and update the group key, which are also unbearable in
WSNs. Since most of the distributed schemes for secure group
communication requires excessive computation to generate the
group key, most of proposed secure group communication
schemes for WSNs are centralized scheme. In this paper, we
focus on centralized group communication schemes.
A few papers [9], [15], [10], [16] address the secure group
communication problem in the content of sensor networks.
However, most of the work consider the whole sensor network
as a group or define the immediate neighboring nodes around a
sensor as a group. For example, in [15], Pietro et al. proposed
a centralized group rekeying scheme based on logical key
tree hierarchy (LKH) for WSNs. The whole sensor network
is considered as a group and the base station is regarded
as the central controller in the group. In [16], Zhang et al.
proposed a group rekeying scheme for filtering false data in
sensor networks. In their scheme, the group is defined as the
immediate neighboring nodes around a sensor.
In [6], Huang et al. proposed a hierarchical secure group
communication scheme for wireless sensor networks. Their
scheme allows multiple groups existing in the sensor network.
Each group has a group controller and shares a group key. A
sensor node can query the group information from the base
station and decide which group to join. The base station is the
only node which can initiate and construct the group-based
tree.
In this paper, we consider a more general situation. A set
of sensor nodes form a group and one of the sensor nodes
takes the role of the group controller. The group controller
starts to initialize and construct the group. We consider the
situations in which the sensor nodes in the group might be
separated by multiple hops. Such groups are attractive in many
applications. For example, many applications in WSNs are
event-based and the focus in these applications is an event
area or area of interest [17]. This area becomes a hotspot in
the sensor network and all the sensor nodes within this area
form a group.
In the following sections we present our proposed central-
ized group rekeying schemes. We use the following notation
for the remainder of this paper:
• A,B are principals such as communicating nodes.
• IDA denotes the sensor identifier of node A.
• e(A, T ) is a set of events observed by sensor A in time
period T .
• KA,B denotes the secret pairwise key shared between A
and B.
• MK is the encryption of message M with key K.
• MAC(K,M) denotes the computation of the message
authentication code of message M with key K.
• A −→ B denotes A unicasts a message to B.
• A −→ ∗ denotes A broadcasts a message to its neighbors.
III. GROUPING AND ITS PROPERTIES
As we discussed before, grouping refers to the process of
combining a set of sensors with similar properties. These
properties usually refer to the events observed by the sensors.
A group can be defined by many aspects. For example, all
photo sensors activated in the last one minute form a group;
the temperature sensors with temperature more than 100◦C
form a group. Without loss of generality, we define a group
G as a set of sensors A in region R which observe an event
E satisfying criteria C in a period of time T:
G = {A|E ∈ e(A, T ) and C and A in R} (1)
where C = C1 ∧ C2 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn and C1, · · · , Cn are criteria
describing the properties of the event, R is a rectangle area
which is defined by its left top and right bottom points, R =
[(x1, y1), (x2, y2)]. Each event is identified by a unique event
id (eid).
Let eid = 1000 represent the temperate event and t
represent the sensing value. The temperature sensors with
3temperature more than 100◦C in the area of (50, 50) to (100,
100) can be defined as:
G = {A | eid = 1000 and
t > 100 and
A in [(50, 50), (100, 100)]}
The lifetime of a group can be divided into three phases, i.e.,
group formation, group maintenance, and group dissolution.
In the group formation phase, the sensor nodes which
satisfy the defined criteria form a group. The process of group
formation is usually triggered by a special node, which is
called a group controller. The group controller can be decided
by the controller selection process. A simple way to decide a
group controller is as follows: when an event E occurs in the
field, the sensor detecting this event and having the strongest
signal stands out as the group controller. The group formation
phase is ended with all the group members receiving the group
key. Then, the group maintenance phase begins.
The group maintenance phase is divided into sessions. The
duration of sessions ∆s can be fixed or dynamic depending
on the applications. The group controller is responsible for
distributing the group key to the sensor nodes during each
session. When new sensors join a group or existing members
leave the group, the group membership must be updated. In
addition, when a compromised group member is detected, the
compromised group member must also be removed from the
group.
In the group dissolution phase, the sensor nodes in the group
are not bound together anymore. If a group member does not
receive the group key update messages in a period of time
τ (τ > ∆s), the key materials become obsolete and can be
released.
IV. GROUP REKEYING SCHEMES FOR SGC IN WSNS
In this section, we present four centralized group rekeying
(CGK) schemes for secure group communication in WSNs. In
Scheme 1 and Scheme 2, the group is initialized and set up
by a sensor node in the group. In Scheme 3 and Scheme 4,
the base station initializes and sets up the group.
A. Security model
We assume that there is a secure channel between the
sensor node and the base station. By a secure channel, we
mean a channel that offers confidentiality, data authentication,
integrity, and freshness. The key materials to build the secure
channel can be set up by the key management protocols
described in [3], [18]. Our proposed schemes depend on some
intrusion detection techniques [19], [20] to be used. If a sensor
node in the group is compromised, the sensor node must be
removed from the group and from the network [18], [21], [22].
We also assume that the base station is well protected and
cannot be compromised. In the remainder of the section, we
present our proposed schemes.
B. Scheme 1-unicasting
Scheme 1 is based on Blundo’s theory [23]. A key tree
is set up during the group formation process and the group
key is distributed to the group members through unicasting
(Figure 1). Scheme 1 consists of five message types, i.e.,
Interesting, Join Request, Leave Request, Forced Leaving, and
Group Key. These messages are described below:
• Interesting, the message requesting expression of interest
in a particular event.
• Join Request, a sensor wants to join the group.
• Leave Request, a group member wants to leave the group.
• Forced Leaving, the message contains the compromised
sensor identifiers to be removed from the group.
• Group Key, the message to distribute the group key.
The complete process of the group formation phase in
Scheme 1 is described below.
1) Setup: Before sensor nodes are distributed, the setup
server randomly generates a bivariate t-degree polyno-
mial f(x, y) =
∑t
i,j=0 aijx
iyj over a finite field Fq
where q is a prime number that is large enough to
accommodate a cryptographic key such that it has the
property that f(x, y) = f(y, x). For each sensor i, the
setup server computes a polynomial share of f(x, y),
that is, f(i, y), and loads the single-variate polynomial
f(i, y) to the sensor i. For any two sensor nodes i
and j, node i can compute the common key f(i, j) by
evaluating f(i, y) at point j, and node j can compute
the same key f(j, i) = f(i, j) by evaluating f(j, y) at
point i.
2) Broadcast interest: Once the group controller is iden-
tified, it first obtains a group identifier gid from the
base station and then generates a random key KG as the
group key. Subsequently, the group controller broadcasts
an Interesting message requesting expression of interest
in a particular event E to its neighboring nodes. The
Interesting message is flooded to the neighboring nodes
which are reachable in at most L hops (global broad-
casting is not necessary) (Figure 1∼(a)):
I −→ ∗ : IDI |gid|E
During the period when the Interesting message is
broadcasted, an uplink pointer (from the sensor node
to the group controller) is kept in each sensor node.
3) Join: All the receivers observing the same event E send
a Join Request to the group controller I (Figure 1∼(b)):
A −→ I : IDA|gid|E,MAC(KAI , IDA|gid|E)
where KAI is the pairwise key shared by the group
controller I with the sensor A. Since each sensor node
keeps an uplink pointer to the group controller, the Join
Request can be sent to the group controller along the
uplink path. Meanwhile, during the period when the Join
Request is transmitted, each en-route node also sets up
a route table including the downlink information to the
sensor nodes. Each item in the route table includes two
fields: 〈destination〉, 〈nexthop〉. The group controller
4also keeps track of the routing information for all group
members.
4) Group key distribution: Once the group controller au-
thenticates the join request, the group controller unicasts
a Group Key message which includes the group key
KG encrypted by the pairwise key to the sensor A
(Figure 1∼(c)):
I −→ A : {KG}KAI
Since routing paths have been set up during the period
when the Interesting message and Join Request mes-
sages are transmitted, the group controller can unicast
the group key to each group member along the routing
path.
In the group key maintenance phase, the group controller
keeps track of the join and leave requests in the group. If
a node receiving the Interesting message wants to join the
group, it will send a Join Request to the group controller
and the group controller can send the group key to the node
as described in steps 3 and 4. If the node fails to receive
the group key in time period ∆s (it may happen due to the
hardware failure of an en-route node), the sensor node can start
a process called probing to reconstruct the key tree structure
(Figure 1∼(d)). In the process of probing, the Join Request
is broadcasted locally (at most L hops) among its neighboring
nodes until it attains the group controller to repair the downlink
path. Then, the group controller can send the group key to the
sensor node.
In case a sensor node leaves the group, there are three
situations [6]:
• Active leaving: a node notifies other group members of
leaving before it moves or runs out of battery power.
• Passive leaving: a node fails silently due to hardware
failure and does not notify other group members.
• Forced leaving: a node might be compromised and is
forced to leave the group by the group controller.
In all three cases, if the leaving node is a leaf node in the
key tree (a leaf node can identify itself according to the routing
table), the key tree is not affected due to the leave of the sensor
node. In case of active leaving, the leaving node sends a Leave
Request to the group controller and the group controller can
update the group key after receiving the request. If a sensor
node fails silently due to hardware failure, it cannot participate
the group after the group key is updated on the next session.
In case a sensor node is compromised and forced to leave
the group, the group controller will update the group key of
non-compromised sensor nodes using unicasting messages as
described in step 4.
If the leaving node is a parent node, the key tree needs to
be reconstructed due to the leave of the sensor node. In case
of active leaving, the leaving node sends a Leave Request to
its parent node and each of its child node. The parent node
updates its routing table (remove the leaving node entries)
when it receives the Leave Request. Since each of the child
node no longer has a parent node, the child node needs to
start the probing process and rejoin the group as described
before. In case of forced leaving, the group controller needs
to update the group key of the remaining sensor nodes in the
group. Since the child nodes of the leaving sensor lost their
links to the group controller, the child nodes need to send Join
Request messages to the group controller and rejoin the group.
If a sensor node fails to receive a Group Key message in time
period ∆s due to the passive leaving of its parent nodes, the
sensor node might be isolated from the key tree and needs to
rejoin the group again.
Let |G| = n. Scheme 1 requires one local broadcast in the
group formation phase. The group controller may receive n
join requests and needs to send the group key to n members.
Thus, to set up the group key among n members, it requires
2n unicasts and one local broadcast. To update the group key,
it requires n unicasts of messages.
Note that Scheme 1 requires n unicasts of messages to
update the group key which may cause heavy traffic in the
area when the group size is large. Further, Scheme 1 has
also to maintain the key tree whenever a sensor node joins or
leaves the group. The management overhead of the key tree
may get worse when the join and leave operations become
frequent. We propose Scheme 2 which uses local broadcast to
replace the unicasts to reduces the communication overhead
when updating the group key.
C. Scheme 2-broadcasting
Scheme 2 is based on Blundo’s theory [23] and the personal
key share distribution scheme [24]. The key tree is used only
for secret share distribution in the group formation process.
After that, the group key is distributed through local broad-
casting and there is no need to maintain the key tree structure.
Scheme 2 consists six message types, i.e., Interesting, Join
Request, Leave Request, Group Key, and Secret Share. The
first five message types are the same with those of Scheme 1.
The Secret Share message is used to distribute a personal
secret in Scheme 2.
The group formation phase in Scheme 2 is described below.
The setup, broadcast interest and join steps (1, 2, and 3) are
the same as in Scheme 1 and are omitted.
4) Secret share distribution: The group controller randomly
picks a 2t-degree masking polynomial, h(x) = h0 +
h1x+· · ·+h2tx2t, over Fq . Each group member Ai gets
the personal secret, Si = h(i), from the group controller
via the Secret Share message:
I −→ Ai : {Si}KAI
5) Distinct share broadcast: Given a set of IDs of revoked
group members, R = {r1, r2, · · · , rw}, w ≤ t, the
group controller randomly picks a t-degree polynomial
p(x) and constructs q(x) = KG − p(x). Then, the
group controller distributes the shares of the t-degree
polynomials p(x) and q(x) to non-revoked sensors using
the Group Key message which is broadcasted in the
group:
B = {R}
∪ {P (x) = g(x)p(x) + h(x)}
∪ {Q(x) = g(x)q(x) + h(x)}
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Fig. 1. Scheme 1 uses unicasting to distribute the group key.
where the revocation polynomial g(x) is constructed as
g(x) = (x− r1)(x− r2) · · · (x− rw).
6) Group key recovery: If any non-revoked sensor node
Ai receives such a broadcast message, it evaluates the
polynomial P (x) and Q(x) at point i and gets P (i) =
g(i)p(i) + h(i) and Q(i) = g(i)q(i) + h(i). Because
Ai knows h(i) and g(i) 6= 0, it can compute p(i) =
P (i)−h(i)
g(i) and q(i) =
Q(i)−h(i)
gj(i)
. Ai can finally compute
the new group key KG = p(i) + q(i). The revoked
sensors cannot recover the group key because g(x) = 0.
In the group maintenance phase, the group controller repeats
step 5 and 6 to distribute the group key during each session.
If a sensor node wants to join the group, the sensor node
sends a Join Request to the group controller. When the group
controller receives the Join Request, it needs to send the secret
share to the sensor node as described in step 4. Then, the
sensor node can reveal the group key on the next session. If
the sensor node fails to receive the group key share in time
period ∆s, the sensor node needs to start the probing process
to find a path to the group controller.
Since the distribution of group key does not depend on the
key tree in Scheme 2, the activate leaving and the passive
leaving have no effect on the key tree. The leaving node
does not need to notify the group controller. In case of forced
leaving, the sensor identifier is added to the revocation list R
in step 5 and thus the revoked sensor node cannot recover the
group key and cannot participate the group communication.
Scheme 2 requires 2n unicasts and two local broadcasts to
set up the group key among n members. However, to update
the group key, it only requires one broadcast message. Since
the distribution of the group key does not depend on the key
tree, Scheme 2 greatly reduces the management overhead of
the group.
Note that Scheme 1 and Scheme 2 are vulnerable to the
flooding attack from insider attackers. Since each sensor node
can potentially be a group controller, a sensor node must be
capable of sending flooding messages. Although the flooding
message is limited only in a local area (limited by the
max-hops a flood message can traverse), an adversary can
compromise a sensor node and abuse the power to start the
flooding attack. Although we can adopt a rate control scheme
[6] to relieve the flooding attack, it does not really solve
the problem. In addition, the lack of efficient local broadcast
authentication schemes in literature might also be a problem
in Scheme 1 and Scheme 2. To protect the sensor network
against the flooding attack and the impersonate of the group
controller, we propose Scheme 3 and Scheme 4.
D. Scheme 3-overlapping
Scheme 3 is also based on the personal key share distri-
bution scheme [24] but the base station is the actual group
controller of the group. The Scheme 3 is inspired by the
revocation scheme proposed in [22]. In [22], Wang et al.
proposed a scheme utilizing a globally distributed session key
to facilitate key revocation scheme. The session key can also
be used to facilitate secure group communication. The group
key can be generated using a function MAC(K,M) over two
secrets, a group key share Ks, and a session key Kj .
6The lifetime of a WSN is partitioned into sessions. A
session key is distribute to the sensor network during each
session. We first describe the group formation process and the
distribution of group key share Ks assuming a session key
is used. Then, we describe the session key Kj distribution
process.
1) Broadcast interesting: The base station broadcast an
Interesting message to the sensor network:
B −→ ∗ : gid|E
The authenticity of the broadcast message is ensured by
broadcast authentication schemes such as µTesla [25]
and its extensions [26], [27]. No one can impersonate a
base station and broadcast an authenticated message.
2) Join: All the receivers observing the same event E send
a Join Request to the base station:
A −→ B : IDA|gid|E,MAC(KA,B , IDA|gid|E)
where KA,B is the pairwise key shared by the sensor
node A with the base station B. The pairwise key can
be set up using the Blundo’s theory as described in
Scheme 1.
3) Group key share distribution: Once the base station
authenticate the join request, the base station unicasts
the group key share Ks to the sensor A using Secret
Share message:
B −→ A : {Ks}KA,B
along the routing paths set up during the transmission of
the Interesting and the Join Request messages (similar
process as described in Scheme 1).
4) Group key recover: Let Kj be the current session key.
Each group member can calculate the shared group key
KG:
KG =MAC(Kj ,Ks)
The session key distribution is the same with the scheme in
[22]. We briefly describe it below. The session key distribution
scheme can be divided into three phases, viz., setup, broadcast,
and session key recovery.
1) Setup: The setup server randomly picks m 2t-degree
masking polynomial, hj(x) = hj,0 + hj,1x + · · · +
hj,2tx
2t, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}, over a finite field Fq where
q is a sufficiently large prime number. For each sensor
node Ai, the setup server loads the personal secrets,
{h1(i), h2(i), · · · , hm(i)}, to the node A. The setup
server also loads the polynomial, hj(x), to the base
station. For each session key Kj , the setup server ran-
domly picks a t-degree polynomial pj(x) and constructs
qj(x) = Kj − pj(x).
2) Broadcast: Given a set of revoked group members, R =
{r1, r2, · · · , rw}, w ≤ t in session j, the base station
distributes the shares of t-degree polynomial pj(x) and
qj(x) to non-revoked sensors via the following broadcast
message:
B = {R}
∪ {Pj(x) = gj(x)pj(x) + hj(x)}
∪ {Qj(x) = gj(x)qj(x) + hj(x)}
where the revocation polynomial gj(x) is constructed as
gj(x) = (x− r1)(x− r2) · · · (x− rw).
3) Session key recovery: If any non-revoked sensor node
Ai receives such a broadcast message, it evaluates the
polynomial Pj(x) and Qj(x) at point i and gets Pj(i) =
gj(i)pj(i) + hj(i) and Qj(i) = gj(i)qj(i) + hj(i).
Because Ai knows hj(i) and gj(i) 6= 0, it can compute
pj(i) =
Pj(i)−hj(i)
gj(i)
and qj(i) = Qj(i)−hj(i)gj(i) . Ai finally
can compute the new session key Kj = pj(i) + qj(i).
In the group maintenance phase, if a sensor node wants to
join the group, the senor node sends a Join Request to the
base station. Then, the base station can send the group key
share to the sensor node and thus the sensor node can recover
the group key. In case of active leaving and passive leaving,
the leaving node does not need to notify the group controller.
When a sensor is forced to leave the group, there are two
options to remove the sensor node from the group: updating
the group key share or update the session key. Since the group
key share can be updated only by unicasting, the solution is
not efficient. However, the session key can be updated using a
broadcast message in one round, thus, it is more efficient than
updating the group key share.
Scheme 3 requires 2n unicasts and one broadcast message
to set up the group among n members. Unlike Scheme 1 and 2,
the unicasting messages are transmitted over the whole sensor
network instead of a local area. Scheme 3 may take longer
time to set up the group. To update the group key, Scheme 3
requires one broadcast message.
E. Scheme 4-preloading
Scheme 4 is a specialization of Scheme 3. Note that the
group formation phase in Scheme 3 may take a long time due
to the use of unicasting to distribute the group key share. If we
know the group membership during the pre-distribution stage,
we can load a group key share on the sensor nodes before
the sensor network is deployed. Thus, the group formation
phase in Scheme 4 can be simplified as the distribution of the
session key only. As shown before, the session key distribution
is efficient and fast. To add a new sensor node in the group,
the setup server needs to load the same group key share to the
sensor node. Then, the join and the leave can be operated as
in Scheme 3.
Note that the solution of preloading a single mission key
on the sensor nodes in the group does not work. Once a
sensor node is compromised, the single mission key is exposed
and cannot ensure the security of the group communication.
In Scheme 4, although an adversary may compromise the
sensor node to steal the group key share, the adversary cannot
participate the group communication until it reveals the session
key.
By preloading a group key share in sensor nodes before
the sensor network is deployed, Scheme 4 greatly reduces the
7group formation time. Scheme 4 requires only one broadcast
message to set up the group and update the group key.
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Security analysis
In Scheme 1 and Scheme 2, the group controller is a sensor
node. Thus, the sensor node must be granted local broadcast
capability to start a group. However, the capability can be
abused by an adversary to start inside flooding attacks. Further,
since the group controller needs to broadcast a message to
its neighboring nodes to request expression of interest, the
authenticity of the local broadcast message must be ensured
to avoid the impersonate of the group controller. However,
most of proposed broadcast authentication scheme such as
[25], [26], [27] are used for authenticating broadcast messages
from the base station and cannot be used for local broadcast.
Without an efficient local broadcast authentication scheme, the
sensor nodes must be trustworthy in Scheme 1 and Scheme 2.
In case a sensor node in the group is compromised, the
adversary can know the group keys which it possesses. If
the compromised sensor node is the group controller, the
compromised sensor node may start revocation attacks to
remove non-revoked sensor nodes from the group.
In Scheme 3 and Scheme 4, the base station is the group
controller to initialize and start the group. Thus, it is not
necessary to grant the local broadcast capability to sensor
nodes. The authenticity of the broadcast message can be
ensured by schemes such as [25], [26], [27]. Since the base
station is trustworthy, no adversary can impersonate the base
station and start the revocation attack either. In case a sensor
node in the group is compromised, the adversary may steal
the group key and eavesdrop the communication until the
compromised sensor node is removed from the network.
B. Performance analysis
We use Blundo’s theory [23] to set up the pairwise keys
in Scheme 1-4. To set up the pairwise key, the sensor node
needs to evaluate the polynomial value at point (i, j). The
polynomial evaluation is efficient in computation and thus the
additional computation overhead for calculating the pairwise
key is almost negligible. To use Blundo’s theory, each sensor
node i needs to store a t-degree polynomial f(i, x), which
occupies (t + 1) log q storage space. In Schemes 2-4, the
personal key share scheme is used. Each sensor node needs one
additional storage unit for the personal secret and the group
controller needs (2t + 1) log q storage unit for the masking
polynomial. The communication overhead of the proposed
schemes is compared in Table I.
Since Scheme 1 depends on a key tree to distribute the
group key, Scheme 1 must maintain the integration of the key
tree when sensors join or leave the group. In Schemes 2-4, the
distribution of the group key does not depend on the key tree.
Thus, it is more easier to handle the join and leave operations
in Schemes 2-4.
VI. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
The performance of the proposed schemes was evaluated
in SENSIM [28], a component-based discrete-event simulator
for sensor networks. Each sensor node in SENSIM consists
of six components, i.e., app, net, mac, phy, event generator,
and battery. The proposed schemes are implemented in the
network component independently. In the simulation, all the
packets sent to the MAC layer are guaranteed to be received
at the receivers. Thus, no packet collisions are considered and
the performance evaluated in the simulation are under ideal
conditions.
TABLE II
CHARACTERISTIC DATA FOR THE MICA2 SENSOR PLATFORM.
Field Value
Effective data rate 19.2kbps
Transmit power 36mW
Receive power 14.4mW
Idle power 14.4mW
Sleep 0.015mW
Transition power 28.8mW
Transition time 800µs
TABLE III
GROUP SIZE AND THE MAX-HOPS IN THE SIMULATION.
L (max-hops) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Group size 16 38 70 126 206 284 389 503
We consider all the schemes operating on a finite field
Fq , where q is a 56-bit integer. The polynomial degree t
in Blundo’s theory is set to t = 4. We use the simulator
parameters that represent the Mica2 Mote radio characteristics.
These parameters are shown in Table II.
We assume that 1000 nodes are uniformly dispersed in a
field with dimension 2000m × 2000m. The base station is
located at (2000, 2000) and the group controller in Scheme 1
and Scheme 2 is set at (1088, 1151). The evaluation metrics
include the group formation time, the group key update time,
the energy consumption in group controller, and the energy
consumption in group member nodes. The group formation
time is the time duration from the group controller broadcast-
ing the interest message till all the group members receive the
first group key. The group key update time is the time period
when the group controller updates the group key of all group
members. It does not include the time when a sensor node
joins or leaves the group.
We test the four schemes for different group sizes. The
group size is decided by a maximum count (max-hops) along
the routes in which the interest message is forwarded and we
assume that all sensor nodes which hear the message become
group members. For each group size, we run the simulation
ten times and the average value is measured. Table III shows
the group size and the max-hops in our simulation. The same
group of sensor nodes is used for all the four schemes in each
test scenario.
Table IV shows the group formation time as the number of
max-hops increases. It shows that Scheme 2 and Scheme 3
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COMPARISON.
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4
message nums size nums size nums size nums size
Group formation unicast 2n O(log q) 2n O(log q) 2n O(log q) 0 n/abroadcast 1 O(log q) 2 O(t log q) 2 O(t log q) 1 O(t log q)
Group key update unicast n O(log q) 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 n/abroadcast 0 n/a 1 O(t log q) 1 O(t log q) 1 O(t log q)
TABLE IV
GROUP FORMATION TIME (SECONDS). GROUP FORMATION IS TIME CONSUMING IN SCHEMES 1-3. BY PRELOADING A GROUP KEY SHARE IN SENOR
NODES, SCHEME 4 GREATLY REDUCES THE GROUP FORMATION TIME.
L (max-hops) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Scheme 1 10.15 26.71 39.92 73.13 112.27 158.40 203.79 272.61
Scheme 2 10.94 28.35 42.53 75.98 115.96 162.82 208.82 278.27
Scheme 3 29.83 46.30 61.06 85.48 128.87 174.93 233.22 277.13
Scheme 4 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
TABLE V
GROUP KEY UPDATE TIME (SCCONDS). SCHEME 3 AND SCHEME 4 ARE MUCH BETTER WHEN UPDATING THE GROUP KEY.
L (max-hops) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Scheme 1 8.10 19.81 37.35 63.88 107.25 144.27 197.55 253.99
Scheme 2 0.61 1.58 2.17 3.19 3.55 4.05 4.69 5.36
Scheme 3 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
Scheme 4 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
require more time to set up the group than Scheme 1. Al-
though the group formation phase is similar in Scheme 1 and
Scheme 3, Scheme 3 takes longer because the whole sensor
network is involved in the group formation phase. Due to
the transmission of additional key materials in Scheme 2,
Scheme 2 needs more time than Scheme 1 to set up the
group. Scheme 2 is even worse than Scheme 3 when the
max-hops is greater than eight. By preloading a group key
share in sensor nodes, Scheme 4 can greatly reduce the group
formation time. The group formation time in Scheme 4 is equal
to the broadcast message transmission time in the network.
Further, we notice that it takes a long time (> 1min) for
Schemes 1-3 to initialize the group when the number of max-
hops is greater than three. It indicates that the number of
max-hops on routes which the interest messages are allowed
to traverse should be less than four. Table V shows the group
key update time in the group maintenance phase. By using the
broadcasting instead of the unicasting to distribute the group
key, Schemes 2-4 are much better than Scheme 1. Scheme 3
and Scheme 4 use the same group key update process and thus
have the same group key update time. Scheme 2 consumes
more energy than Schemes 3 and 4 because it requires more
communication rounds (L) to flood the message.
Figure 2 shows the average group controller energy con-
sumption in the group formation and the group key update
phrases. Since the base station takes the role of the group
controller in Schemes 3 and 4, the energy consumption of
Scheme 3 and Scheme 4 is not shown in the figures. As the
figures indicate, although Scheme 1 requires less energy for
the group controller to set up the group, the group controller
in Scheme 1 consumes much more energy to update the group
key. Because the group key is updated at regular time intervals,
Scheme 1 may cause the group controller to deplete its energy
much faster than Scheme 2.
Tables VI and VII show the average group member energy
consumption in the group formation and group key update
phases. As the tables show, Scheme 1 is slightly better than
Schemes 2-3 in the group formation phase but Schemes 2-3
are far better than Scheme 1 in the group key update phase.
Due to the preloading of the group key share in sensor nodes,
Scheme 4 performs the best in both the group formation and
the group key update phases.
Figure 3 shows the energy distribution among group mem-
bers when the number of max-hops is three. As the figures
show, Scheme 1 may cause the energy to be distributed
unevenly in the group formation phase. However, the energy
is distributed more evenly in Schemes 2 and 3 in both the
group formation and group update phases. Scheme 4 has no
such issues due to the use of broadcasting messages.
To summarize, with respect to the group formation time
and the energy consumption in the group controller and the
group member sensor nodes, Scheme 1 is slightly better
than Schemes 2-3 in the group formation phase; however,
Schemes 2-3 are far better than Scheme 1 in the group key
update phase. In the simulation, we use a simple flooding
protocols to set up the route path in Scheme 3. In consideration
that the routing paths might be set up before the group
formation phase and the setup of the routing paths can also
benefit the data acquisition in the network, Scheme 3 is a
better solution for secure group communication in sensor
networks. As the simulation results show, if we can group the
sensor nodes together before the sensor network is deployed,
Scheme 4 is the best selection for secure group communication
in sensor networks. Note that the performance of Scheme 1
represents a general category of secure group communication
schemes using a key tree structure.
9TABLE VI
AVERAGE GROUP MEMBER ENERGY CONSUMPTION (JOULES): GROUP FORMATION PHASE.
L (max-hops) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Scheme 1 0.15 0.39 0.58 1.06 1.63 2.29 2.95 3.94
Scheme 2 0.16 0.41 0.62 1.10 1.68 2.36 3.02 4.02
Scheme 3 0.42 0.66 0.86 1.23 1.85 2.52 2.35 4.00
Scheme 4 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
TABLE VII
AVERAGE GROUP MEMBER ENERGY CONSUMPTION (JOULES): GROUP KEY UPDATE PHASE.
L (max-hops) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Scheme 1 0.12 0.29 0.54 0.92 1.55 2.08 2.85 3.67
Scheme 2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
Scheme 3 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Scheme 4 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(a) Group formation phase. (b) Group key update phase.
Fig. 2. Average group controller energy consumption (Joules). Scheme 1 requires less energy for the group controller to set up the group, however, the
group controller in Scheme 1 consumes much more energy to update the group key.
(a) Scheme 1 (b) Scheme 2 (c) Scheme 3
Fig. 3. Average group member energy distribution by hops (Joules). Scheme 1 may cause the energy to be distributed unevenly in the group formation
phase.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed four centralized group rekeying
(CGK) schemes for secure group communication in WSNs. As
the simulation and analysis show, if the group membership can
be decided before the sensor network is deployed, Scheme 4
is the best selection for secure group communication in sensor
networks. If the group membership is decided dynamically af-
ter the sensor network is deployed, Scheme 3 is a better option.
Due to the lack of the efficient local broadcast authentication
schemes in sensor networks, Schemes 1 and 2 are vulnerable
to the flooding attack from inside attackers.
As the simulation shows, by distributing a session key to the
whole sensor network, the group key update phases is efficient.
However, the group formation phase may take a long time
(> 2mins) when the number of max-hops is great than four.
The group formation phase needs to be improved when the
group membership is decided dynamically. Further, efficient
local broadcast authentication schemes are also needed for
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local broadcast in the sensor networks.
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